Historians debate over whether General George Washington lost more battles than he won during America’s War of Independence. By my own count his Continental Army was directly involved in seventeen major battles. Six ended in clear American victory. The British indisputably prevailed in seven. In the other four battles, the victor was unclear.
But what finally decided the war on the side of America was that, despite losing seven major battles, none of the British victories were decisive. Somehow, General Washington always managed to extricate the bulk of his army from the field of battle, saving it to fight another day. By preserving his army, he was able to keep the war going until the British finally decided that retaining thirteen rebellious colonies as a part of their empire was too expensive a proposition.
There was one battle though, where the escape of Washington’s army was a very near thing—even miraculous. On March, 17, 1776 the British were forced out of Boston, courtesy of large siege guns placed atop Dorchester Heights by the Continental Army. The guns had been captured from the British on May 10, 1775 at the Battle of Fort Ticonderoga. After the British were forced from Boston, General Washington correctly guessed that they would next focus their attention on taking New York. New York had a good harbor. It was an ideal place to quarter an army. Capturing the city would effectively split the colonies in two. From New York troops and ships could move north or south at will.
Defending New York was a tall proposition, but to abandon the city without a fight was politically impossible. Delegates from the thirteen American colonies had just signed the Declaration of Independence. Defending New York would demonstrate American resolve—or the lack thereof. Washington marched his troops into the city and began digging defensive earthworks on Manhattan Island and on Brooklyn Heights on Long Island. To defend the whole area, he had some 19,000 troops. But about half were poorly trained, undisciplined militia. Illness also plagued his ranks, rendering many of his troops too sick to fight.
On July 2, 1777 the British Fleet, commanded by Admiral Richard “Black Dick” Howe, arrived in New York and landed the first contingent of British soldiers, commanded by Admiral Howe’s brother, General Sir William Howe, on Staten Island. By August 12 General Howe had 32,000 troops, including 8,000 Hessians under his command against Washington’s 19,000. The British fleet numbered thirty-seven warships, 1,200 guns, 10,000 sailors, and hundreds of supporting vessels. It was at the time the largest concentration of British naval power ever assembled.
Unsure if the British would first attack Manhattan or Long Island, General Washington divided his force. General Nathanael Greene, with 4,000 of Washington’s best troops, was dispatched to defend Long Island. On August 20 General Greene became ill and had to be replaced by John Sullivan of New Hampshire.
On August 22, 15,000 British troops left Staten Island and landed on Long Island, along with forty pieces of artillery. In response, Washington reinforced the Brooklyn Heights contingent with only another 1,500 troops, still thinking that the landing was a diversion. Two days later, dissatisfied with Sullivan’s efforts, he replaced him with Israel Putman of Connecticut. Putman arrived on August 25, with six additional battalions, bringing his entire force to nearly 8,000 men. By this time, the British had 20,000 troops on Long Island. Though heavily outnumbered, Washington hoped that by defending the entrenched high ground of Brooklyn Heights, his forces would be able to thwart the British by inflicting upon them unacceptable casualties.
There were three main passes through the heights: Gowanus Road, Flatbush Road, and Bedford Road, all of which the Americans guarded heavily. But there was a fourth, lesser known pass called Jamaica Pass, that was left undefended. Loyalists in the area informed the British of the weakness.
On August 27, the battle began with a frontal attack upon the Americans, spearheaded by the 8,000 mercenary Hessians. Once the American forces were engaged, 10,000 British troops, who had secretly marched through the Jamaica pass, suddenly materialized to outflank the Americans from the east. The Americans, taken by surprise, fell back in disorder. Only a spirited rear-guard action by what is known as the Maryland 400, commanded by Major Mordecai Gist, saved the entire force from annihilation. The Maryland 400, which actually numbered less than 300, managed to hold off the British while the bulk of the American army fell back into a semi-circular defensive position, two miles across and about one mile deep on the shore of the East River. Few of the Maryland 400 survived the onslaught.
Washington, realizing by this time that this was the main British attack, called for reinforcements. On August 28, 1,200 more men came across the East River; Colonel John Glover’s regiment from Marblehead, Massachusetts and General Thomas Mifflin’s brigade from Pennsylvania.
At this point the first miracle occurred. Despite strong urging from subordinate officers, General Howe chose not to press the attack on the concentrated American force. He believed that the Americans were trapped, as the Royal Navy was now in control of the East River, Washington’s only escape route to Manhattan. He did not want a repeat of the debacle at Bunker Hill, where he had won a too expensive victory. He expected Washington to surrender. What Howe did not realize was that the escape route to Manhattan was still open, courtesy of the second miracle. A contrary wind was keeping the British warships out of the one-mile wide East River.
After inspecting the American defenses and assessing the British strength, General Mifflin saw that the American position was hopeless. He recommended retreat back across the East River as the only option. His brigade would serve as the rear guard to hold the British at bay while the rest of the army escaped. Washington sent word to General William Heath in Manhattan to send every available flat bottom boat to the Brooklyn ferry dock.
At 11pm on August 29 the evacuation began under great secrecy, with Colonel John Glover and his Marbleheads, all expert seaman, in charge. The evacuees were forbidden to talk. General Mifflin’s men kept their campfires burning to make the British think that nothing was happening.
But as the evacuation progressed, Washington realized that it was not going fast enough. It would not be completed by daybreak. He needed more time. Major Benjamin Talmage, who was a part of General Mifflin’s rearguard wrote about the third miracle in his memoirs some years later.
“After dawn of the next day approached, those of us who remained in the trenches became very anxious for our own safety, and when the dawn appeared there were several regiments here on duty. At this time, a very dense fog began to rise out of the ground and off the river. It seemed to settle in a peculiar manner over both encampments. I recollect this peculiar Providential occurrence perfectly well. And so very dense was the atmosphere that I could scarcely discern a man six yards distance. We tarried until the sun had risen but the fog remained as dense as ever.”
By 7am the evacuation was complete. Soon after British patrols cautiously probed to check on the American defenses and found them empty. The British went on to capture New York on September 15, 1776, but it was a hollow victory. By the intervening hand of God the most important prize had eluded them. Washington and his army had escaped to fight another day.
